Sometimes, ontological debates concern whether a contested class of entities exists: classic examples of such questions include “do numbers exist?”, “do composite material objects exist”, and “do fictional characters exist?” In addition to this kind of “disagreement over cases,” (Quine) however, we might also wonder more generally what it is that we are asking in posing these questions: when I ask whether numbers exist, is this the same sort of question as when I ask whether there are objects of some type in ordinary and scientific contexts. In this course, we will primarily be concerned with the second—“metaontological”—sort of question. We will examine several prominent discussions of ontology, including those of Frege, Meinong, and Quine, as well as challenges to the substantiveness of ontological disputes (Carnap, Hirsch). Finally, we will look at several current proposals to reorient metaphysical inquiry from the Quinean question of “what there is” to the Neo-Aristotelian question of “what is fundamental?” (Schaffer, Fine). Readings and discussion in English and German.