The concept of suspending judgment has been pivotal in the history of philosophy, primarily as a means to other ends such as attaining tranquillity in Pyrrhonian Scepticism, securing knowledge for René Descartes, or accessing reality without bias for Edmund Husserl. However, discussions of the nature of suspension of judgment and its specific normative profile have been nearly non-existent in historical accounts. In contemporary debates, suspending judgment has only recently been recognized as a third doxastic stance, alongside belief and disbelief, representing a positive phenomenon (and not just the absence of an opinion) to be studied in its own right. In this seminar, we will discuss various contemporary suggestions concerning the nature of suspension (the relevant mental states and processes involved) and its normative profile.
Die Veranstaltung wurde 20 mal im Vorlesungsverzeichnis WiSe 2024/25 gefunden:
