Are facts about the nervous system sufficient to explain cognition? Can mental health sufficiently beexplained by neural activity? Do brainless living beings possess cognitive capacities in their adaptationto survive their environments? Does intelligent cognition possess properties that do not reduce to thenervous system? In this seminar, we will explore the so-called E-Cognition positions (Embodied,Enactive, Extended, Ecological) as a rejection of the reduction of cognition to (neuro)cognitiveprocesses. Specifically, we will appraise cognition in terms of dynamically unfolding, situatedembodied interactions between the organism and aspects of their world. Further, we will examine Ecognitionthrough the lens of the theory that seems equipped to formally respond to questionsresulting from dynamical interactions with the environment — Dynamical Systems Theory. Studentswill closely engage with recent philosophical and dynamical systems work presented in an interactiveseminar setting.
