While classical mind-body problem was understood as an ontological question, the more recent discussion focuses on epistemological problems: can we hope to explain consciousness in the way we explain other higher-level properties? Many philosophers think that the prospects are dim, particularly with respect to phenomenal states like pain or color experiences.
The present seminar will challenge this view. First, we will provide some historical background, demonstrating the origin of these problems in early modern philosophy. Second, we will discuss some of the well-known arguments allegedly showing that phenomenal states cannot be captured in functional terms and, therefore, evade a reductive explanation. We will also consider whether phenomenal states like pain can be measured in ways that physical properties can. Finally, in a somewhat speculative approach, we will try to better understand what kind of entities phenomenal states are, how they are related to bodily activities, and what an explanation might look like.
Every participant should be familiar with the debate on the problem of consciousness, particularly:
Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-361.
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies II, 200-219.