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Functional descriptions who capture entities in terms of their causes and effects play an essential role in scientific theories. The seminar will focus how these descriptions work, how they differ across scientific disciplines (philosophy, biology, cognitive science, physics), and whether they “leave something out”, e.g. some intrinsic properties or the “essence” of an object.
E.g. it was thought until the end of the 19th century, that the “essential nature” of force and matter that cannot be captured in functional terms. Similar questions have been raised later with respect to essence of phenomenal experience in the philosophy of mind.
The seminar will read seminal texts by proponents and critics of functional descriptions, particularly from physics, biology, and the philosophy of mind, with a focus on recent discussion on the limitations and the potential of functional descriptions of cognitive processes and related explanations.
Block, N. (1980). What is Functionalism? Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, ed. N. Block.
Poincaré, H. (1905). Science and hypothesis. London, Newcastle on Tyne, Scott.
Block, N. (1991). Troubles with functionalism. The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 211--228.
Doerig, A., et al. (2019). "The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness." Consciousness and Cognition 72: 49-59.
Die Veranstaltung wurde 29 mal im Vorlesungsverzeichnis WiSe 2024/25 gefunden:
