| Kommentar |
Political economy deals with the interactions of states and markets. In other words, it is concerned with the economic effects of political choices and the impact of economic conditions on the decisions and performance of political actors. The goal of this seminar is to provide an overview of how the discipline of political economy theorizes about and empirically investigates competition, conflict, and cooperation. After an introduction to political economy and its methods, several broad questions related to competition are discussed in the first part of the seminar. What are the economic effects of political competition? How do states and firms compete in the global economy for market shares and finances? The seminar then moves on to analyze the political economy of conflict. What are the domestic and international reasons for political conflict and civil war? Under which economic conditions does international conflict take place and how is it economically different from domestic violent conflict? The final part of the class asks the question of how cooperation arises within and between political systems. How does the economic environment shape the emergence of domestic coalitions? What are the reasons for states to cooperate on economic issues? |
| Literatur |
Please note that this literature list is incomplete and subject to change.
- Acemoglu & Robinson 2006: Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
- Baum and Lake 2003: The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital
- Beramendi et al. 2015: The Politics of Advanced Capitalism
- Besley et al. 2010: Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US
- Binzer Hobolt & Klemmensen 2008: Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective
- Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2001: Political Competition and Economic Growth
- Cleary 2007: Electoral Competition, Participation, and Government Responsiveness in Mexico
- Cohen 1996 Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance
- Cox 1999: Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination
- Gartzke 2007: The Capitalist Peace
- Grieco & Ikenberry 2002: State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy
- Hall & Soskice 1998: Mixed Signals: Coordinated Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and EMU
- Hiscox 2000: Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade
- Iversen & Soskice 2010: Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: The Political Economy of Skill Formation, Wage Compression, and Electoral Systems
- Jensen 2003: Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment
- Keech 2013: Economic Politics in the United States: The Costs and Risks of Democracy
- Kennedy 1989: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
- Keohane 1984: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
- Lake & Baum 2001: Invisible Hand of Democracy - Political Control and the Provision of Public Services
- Li & Resnick 2003: Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries
- Milner & Kubota 2005: Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries
- North & Weingast 1989: Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England
- Oneal & Russett 1999: The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992
- Pinto & Timmons 2005: The Political Determinants of Economic Performance: Political Competition and the Sources of Growth
- Pitlik 2007: Race to Liberalization? Diffusion of Economic Policy among OECD countries
- Rogowski 1987: Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade
- Schultz & Weingast 2003: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition
- Simmons & Elkins 2004: The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy
- Strange et al. 1991: Rival States, Rival Firms - Competition for World Market Shares
- Tilly 1990: Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992
- Waltz 2000: Structural Realism after the Cold War
|
