This lecture looks at Kant’s moral philosophy from the perspective of contemporary metaethics. We will discuss questions such as the following: Is Kant a cognitivist or a non-cognitivist about moral judgements or does he favor a hybrid account? How does Kant think of the relation between value and normativity: is the ought grounded in the good or the good grounded in the ought? In how far are moral judgements and moral facts grounded in practical reason and the will? What is Kant’s account of reasons and their connection to motivation? Does Kant want to defend moral judgements against skeptical doubts and if yes in what sense and by what means? Does he explain normative claims on the basis of non-normative claims? Etc. We will see that Kant’s views and their combination often differ from typical contemporary positions and discuss in how far this makes his account attractive. The lectures will be given in English.
Die Veranstaltung wurde 3 mal im Vorlesungsverzeichnis SoSe 2025 gefunden:
